Great Power Peace: Examining Why the Peace Between the Song and Liao Dynasties Lasted Over One Hundred Years by DiFiore, Matthew
Great Power Peace: Examining Why the Peace Between the Song 







History Honors Thesis 
Dr. Evelyn Rawski and Dr. Vincent Leung 





 From the late tenth to the early twelfth century, the Song dynasty (960- 1279 A.D.) ruled 
nearly all of China proper.1 During this period, the Song dynasty regularly confronted its 
powerful and older nomadic neighbor, the Liao (907-1125 A.D.). The Liao ruled a vast area 
including part of North China. Eventually, the Song and Liao fought a long on and off war over 
the part of North China known as the Sixteen Prefectures (See Map 2).2 After the war, the two 
empires experienced over one hundred years of peace between them. This paper will examine 
why the two most powerful states in East Asia, the Song and Liao dynasties, managed to 
preserve peace for over one hundred years.  According to a modern day theory of international 
relations, Offensive Realism, this extended period of peace between great powers should not 
have happened. The theory fails to explain why the peace occurred. Thus, by examining this 
case study, factors that could lead to great power peace today could be better understood, 
allowing for more accurate prediction of when conflict could occur.  
Map 1: East Asia from Late 10th to the Early 12th Centuries3 
                                                             
1 Paul Jakov Smith, “Introduction: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors,” in Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith, 
ed., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 5 Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) pp. 14, 20-8. 
2 Smith, “Introduction,” pp. 14, 20. 
3 Tao Jing-Shen, Two Sons of Heaven (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1988) p. 108 
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Offensive Realism is a sub school of realism developed by Jon Mearsheimer to 
specifically examine the behavior of great powers and is based on five assumptions. These 
assumptions apply specifically to nation states. First, the international system is anarchic, 
meaning there are no higher powers to enforce agreements between states. Consequently, 
states may take what they want because they cannot be sure other states will abide by an 
agreement.  Second, states cannot be sure of the intentions of other states. This uncertainty 
results from the fluid nature of international relations, causing states to adjust their behavior 
quickly. This assumption applies to both two state and multistate systems. Third, great powers 
possess offensive military capability to hurt or even destroy other great powers. Fourth, the 
primary goal of great powers is to survive. Great powers strive to attain as much power as 
possible so as to maximize their chances of survival. Consequently, great powers attempt to 
change the international situation in their favor. The only great powers that are not revisionist 
are hegemons. Finally, great powers are rational actors leading them to think strategically 
about their options for survival within the international system.4 To back up his theory, 
Mearsheimer uses numerous case studies such as imperial Japan from 1868-1945, Germany 
under the leadership of Bismarck, and the Soviet Union, to name a few.5 However, every theory 
has its limitations. Mearsheimer admits to this and even says that it is inevitable that a theory 
will fail to explain certain events.   
There is an inherent danger in using current day theories of international relations to 
judge the behavior of pre-modern states because of several key differences between pre-
modern states and modern states involving the relationship of the population to the state, 
                                                             
4 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001) pp. 30-36. 
5 Mearheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 172-202. 
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administration, legitimacy, and nationalism.  The modern state’s legitimacy rests on a social 
contract where sovereignty is drawn from the consent of the governed.6 Even non-democratic 
states such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR must pay lip service to their 
population by arguing why their policies are good for society as a whole. The modern state has 
a one on one relationship with its population. Citizens have a series of rights with reciprocal 
obligations in return. Citizens may have free speech but should participate in the political 
system in return. The state actively mobilizes its population for policy initiatives, because their 
legitimacy and success depends on public participation or support. To make this mobilization 
possible, the state actively promotes literacy among the population so they can absorb and 
better understand large and complex political issues.7 Fiscally, the state directly taxes its 
citizens and receives a cash payment, internal trade barriers are absent, and a national 
infrastructure is developed and maintained. Legally, there is a codified law code applied to the 
entire population regardless of wealth or status. These characteristics give the modern state 
greater ability to extract resources and mobilize its population.  
There are a variety of pre-modern states ranging from tribal units to vast empires. For 
this paper, empires are the most relevant pre-modern states. Legitimacy is based on divine 
right, where the king emperor claims approval from a supernatural force to rule. They had an 
indirect relationship with their population. The pre-modern state lacked the resources to 
penetrate deeply into society, necessitating intermediaries.  The state had to rely on local elites 
to help rule as they had the literacy necessary to do so.  Consequently, the pre-modern state 
co-existed with semiautonomous local units, which placed an upper limit on the amount of 
                                                             
6Ernst  Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) p. 32, 
7 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 32. 
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resources the state could collect.8 For example, the Qing Empire ruled over a vast area, but the 
state’s control over those areas varied from region to region as there were different systems of 
administration to accommodate local elites.9 By contrast, the PRC extended its institutions and 
policies across the entire area controlled by the state.10  
The pre-modern state placed a greater emphasis on defining the boundaries between 
classes.11 Consequently, there was no codified law applied uniformly across the population as 
judgments were based on the status of an individual.  There were exceptions, such as Legalism 
in China, making law the area where there was the least contrast between modern and pre-
modern states. Also, populations in pre-modern states placed great emphasis on local custom, 
which further inhibited a national law code.12 Fiscally, centralized empires taxed their citizens 
directly but taxes could be collected in the form of food or cloth. The state could also demand 
labor service as payment. 
Beginning in the 19th century, the rise of nationalism marked another key difference 
between modern and pre-modern state. Nationalism is the creation and promotion of a 
particular national identity by a state. States sought to promote a national identity as a way to 
boost legitimacy to show they represented and promoted their populations’ interests. A 
national identity can be defined as an “imagined political community that is sovereign and 
limited”.13 Such an identity is “imagined” because a person does not see the vast majority of 
                                                             
8 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 13. 
9 James A. Millward, A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) pp. 98-99. 
10 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) 
pp.345-58. 
11 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism,  p. 10. 
12 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism,  p. 10 . 
13 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983) p. 6. 
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the people in the nation with whom he or she claims to share an identity.14 Consequently, mass 
ceremonies and habits are developed to promote the existence of that identity.15 This national 
identity does not have to be narrow but can be broad as well. For example, the American 
national identity encompasses many ethnicities and is used as a unifying force.16 The national 
identity is limited because a finite number of people are in it, but the number is elastic.17 A 
nation may have a state of its own or desire an independent state of its own.18 
These fundamental changes in the characteristics of a state could have caused the 
norms that govern international relations to change. Since modern states have a larger capacity 
to extract resources, they can continue military operations longer, but must maintain public 
support or a façade of public support. Modern states must also deal with the pressures that 
nationalism exposes them to.  These differences could have caused a fundamental difference in 
behavior in international relations. Such a change would negate Offensive Realism when 
examining pre-modern states, since it uses the behavior of nation states as the basis for the 
theory.  
The differences between a modern state and a pre-modern state make it necessary to 
briefly show that Offensive Realism was mostly valid from the tenth to the twelfth centuries. 
First, the international system was clearly anarchic from the mid-tenth to the early twelfth 
centuries. There was no greater power to regulate disputes between the Liao and Song and 
ensure their compliance with agreements. Second, the Song and Liao were uncertain of the 
other’s intentions. This uncertainty resulted from a fluid international system and a lack of 
                                                             
14Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6. 
15 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 35. 
16 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 26. 
17 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 7. 
18 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 7. 
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information.  The Song feared a Liao alliance with a neighboring power, the Xi Xia, in the 1040s, 
but the Xia and Liao ended up fighting each other.19 The Liao worried about the offensive 
potential of the hydraulic defense network built by the Song, seemingly unaware that the Song 
only viewed the network as a defensive measure.20 The multi-state nature of the international 
system further increased uncertainty. The Liao and Song gathered intelligence not only about 
each other but neighboring states as well and never had complete and fully accurate 
information about any of them. It also increased the complexity of their power calculations, 
because they had to consider what others would do or how their actions affected others.  
For the most part, the Song and Liao empires thought rationally about their goals. Song 
Taizu conquered the southern kingdoms because there were more openings, and they were 
weaker than the Liao.21 The Liao wisely accepted Shi Jintang’s offer to gain the strategic Sixteen 
Prefectures without a fight.22 However, it will be shown that this rationality had important 
limitations due to factional competition in domestic politics. Finally, each empire sought to 
survive through increasing their power and revising the international situation. The Song 
strengthened its power and chances for survival by limiting the political threat of its own 
military, conquest of the southern kingdoms, and the attempted conquest of strategic Liao 
territory.23 To increase its chances of survival, the Liao conquered the wealthy kingdom of 
                                                             
19 Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, p. 63. 
20 Peter Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China,” in Don Wyatt, ed.,  Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and 
Identity in the Chinese Middle Period (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p. 68. 
21 Lau Nap-Yin, and Huang K’uan-chung, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty under T’ai-tsu (960-976), 
T’ai-tsung (976-997), Chen-tsung (997-1022),” in Dennis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith, ed., The Cambridge 
History of China Vol. 5 Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) pp. 224-28. 
22 Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, pp. 60-1. 
23 Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” pp. 215-28, 234-37 . 
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Bohai and extracted the strategic Sixteen Prefectures from China.24 Offensive realism is mostly 
valid for the situation but clearly it has its limitations.  
This paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will provide an overview 
of the sources of conflict, the military capacity of the two empires, and the geopolitical 
situation before the conflict. This overview will be followed by a discussion of the twenty-five 
year war between the two empires. It will be argued that this war between the two empires 
laid a foundation for a long lasting peace between them. The conflict blunted the offensive 
capabilities of each empire’s military, making offensive military action by either side 
increasingly costly and unproductive. The cost of military action forced the Song and Liao 
dynasties to find a negotiated solution that was desirable to both parties, which resulted in the 
Treaty of Shanyuan of 1005.   
The second section of the paper will examine how the peace was consolidated by both 
the Song and Liao dynasties in the period between the years 1005-1050.  Advocates of a non-
belligerent foreign policy gained control of the Song government. The policy of conciliation was 
rational, but there was sometimes strong opposition to that policy. The factional competition 
shows an important limitation of rational decision-making. The available foreign policy options 
were limited to the acceptable range of policies a governing faction would implement. The Liao 
also focused on internal affairs and was occupied by other foreign policy adventures such as the 
war with the Koryo dynasty of Korea. The section will conclude with the first Sino-Tangut war of 
1038-45 and the Liao campaigns against the Xi Xia, showing the full effect of the limitations of 
                                                             
24 Dennis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in  Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge 




the rational choice model. The Liao had an excellent opportunity to invade and should have, but 
declined to do so.  Instead, the Liao threatened war and entered into negotiations with the 
Song to extract concessions. This decision goes against offensive realism which would have 
predicted that the Liao would have attacked the Song after it had been weakened by military 
defeats.  
The final section of the paper will show how the Song became an expansionist empire 
again from 1068-1119 A.D.  Emperors promoted an expansionist foreign policy, weakening the 
power of the non-belligerent advocates. Consequently, the peace was threatened between the 
Liao and Song, because the Song desired to eventually conquer Liao territory. The Song aimed 
to conquer small tribal kingdoms and the Xi Xia before moving to conquer the Sixteen 
Prefectures. The peace lasted in large part because of Xi Xia survival and Song wariness of 
bringing the Liao into conflict between them and the Xi Xia. Due to Song military defeats, the 
non-belligerent faction made a temporary revival but failed to stop the expansionist tide. The 
behavior of the Song during this period mostly fits with Offensive Realism, as it acted as a 
revisionist great power trying to change the international situation in its favor.  However, the 
continued competition between domestic factions shows that this policy outcome was not 
inevitable and is further evidence of the limits of the rational actor model.   
Military Capabilities of the Period 
Cavalry and static defenses dominated military conflicts during the period from the 
tenth to the early twelfth centuries. Cavalry possessed greater mobility than infantry. As a 
result, cavalry could strike faster and harder than an infantry army.  Cavalry armies enjoyed 
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their greatest advantage over infantry armies in the open field, where the greater space 
allowed them to use their superior mobility to maximum advantage.   
The Liao-Song conflict exemplifies the advantages a cavalry army had over a 
predominantly infantry army. The ruling ethnic group of the Liao Empire, the Khitan, were 
pastoral nomads that migrated to different grazing areas based on the season. Horses were 
extremely important to the Khitan, and the Liao maintained an all cavalry army. In contrast, the 
Song was a sedentary empire that maintained a predominantly infantry army.  The main 
battlefield was the open plains of Hebei, where the Liao could take full advantage of its 
mobility25. Thus, the Liao could run down the Song infantry en mass when they defeated the 
Song in battle or quickly get away if their army lost the battle.26 As a result, the Liao could inflict 
massive casualties on the Song in a victory and limit the damage to their own army in the case 
of a defeat. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Song could develop a cavalry force that rivaled 
that of the Liao. The Song dynasty never controlled a part of Central Asia where the best 
warhorses were located. This circumstance left their cavalry force quantitatively and 
qualitatively inferior to the Liao.27 Thus, the Song had to rely on its infantry army to beat the 
Liao.  Failure was not inevitable. A Song infantry army could beat a Liao cavalry army as will be 
shown in the Northern Han campaign, but they were always at a distinct disadvantage in the 
open field.  
                                                             
25 Peter Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” (Ph.D. Dissertation,  University of Pennsylvania, 
1996),  p. 59. 
26 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” p. 33-4. 
27 Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” p. 247. 
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Where the Song excelled was in static defenses and siege warfare. The Song used a 
variety of siege weapons such as trebuchets and team- operated crossbows.28 The Song was as 
incapable of capturing a heavily fortified city as the Liao but was more willing to attack large 
targets. Thus, Song siege operations possessed the potential to have a major negative impact 
for the Liao.  The Song army besieged major cities such as Taiyuan and Yuzhou, while the Liao 
mostly besieged forts and towns.29 Static defenses of the Song and Liao were walled towns, 
cities, forts, and canals. The walls consisted of tamped earth with a wet or dry moat around the 
city.30 The most heavily fortified part of a city was the gate, as that bore the brunt of the attack. 
Cities and forts included towers on the wall to protect soldiers from missiles and weather. Forts 
differed from cities in that they were established for purely military reasons and their size and 
population were often smaller than a county seat.31 Canals were mainly used by the Song and 
enabled faster transportation of supplies and troops to the front line, while the paddy fields 
around the canals limited Liao mobility. As will be shown below, static defenses helped 
tremendously in evening the fight between the Liao and Song. The Liao armies proved unable 
to capture strategic fortresses time and again, limiting the Liao’s military effectiveness.  
Finally, the Song and Liao had different methods and capacities to supply and fund their 
army.  The Liao army always fielded an army without a supply train. This method allowed 
greater mobility but forced the Liao army to live off the land.32 The length of the Liao army’s 
campaign depended on how far they penetrated enemy territory. If they were stopped, the 
                                                             
28 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” p. 52. 
29 Shui-lung Tsang, “War and Peace in Northern Sung China: Violence and Strategy in Flux, 960-1104,” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, The University of Arizona, 1997), p. 100 . 
30 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State”, p. 63. 
31 Lorge.”War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” p. 73. The Liao had walled towns in the Sixteen 
Prefectures where there was a predominantly Han population.  
32 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State”, p. 59. 
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army quickly used up the supplies in the surrounding area and was forced to retreat.  The Song 
brought their supplies with them, which allowed them to stop for an extended period of time.  
However, if they extended beyond the range of their supply train, the Song army experienced 
major problems.  Trouble with the supply line contributed to the failure of the 986 invasion of 
the Sixteen Prefectures and the 1081 invasion of the Xi Xia.33 
Over the long term, war was not in the interest of the Liao if there was no conquest. The 
Liao Empire contained a much smaller fiscal base than the Song as they only had a population 
of a few million, with the vast majority living in the Sixteen Prefectures. Repeatedly going to 
war put a heavy strain on the Liao’s finances and risked social unrest.34 In contrast, the Song 
government experienced increasing fiscal wealth. The central government successfully 
implemented policies that allowed them to bring tax revenue from the prefectures to the 
central government. The conquest of the first four southern kingdoms added about 1.6 million 
registered households to the tax rolls.35 The annexation of the Wu Yue(See Map 3) in 978 added 
further wealth to the Song government.  Also, the Song did not achieve its largest surplus 
revenue until 1021.36 The Song was in a period of increasing revenue and could fight a war of 
attrition with the Liao if need be. Overall, the two empires were evenly matched which showed 
itself repeatedly in the conflict.   
The Sixteen Prefectures 
                                                             
33 Paul Jakov Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-Shih,” in Dennis Twitchett and Paul 
Jakov Smith, ed., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 5 Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 475 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State”, p. 241. 
34. Nap-Yin Lau, “Waging War for Peace?: The Peace Accord between the Liao and Song in A.D. 1005,” in Hans Van 
deVen, ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden, NE: Brill, 2000)  pp. 191-2  
35 Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” p. 224-8 Peter Lorge, p. 210. 
36 Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty under,” p. 273. 
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The military conflict between the Liao and Song empires centered on an area in North 
China known as the Sixteen Prefectures. This area was located in Hebei and contains modern 
day Beijing.37 The region was critical to both the Song and Liao for political, strategic, and 
economic reasons. It contained all the north-south passages between China and the steppe.38 
Whoever controlled them enjoyed a strategic edge as they could more easily attack and defend 
from the state on the other side of the mountains. The Liao gained control of the Sixteen 
Prefectures in 936 when they agreed to help the Later Jin (See Map 4) founder overthrow the 
Later Tang (See Map 3) in exchange for the prefectures.39 The Sixteen Prefectures were very 
important economically to the Liao Empire. The majority of the Liao Empire’s population lived 
in the Sixteen Prefectures and it was the Liao’s center of commerce. If the Liao ever lost the 
Sixteen Prefectures, it would have crippled its empire.40 
For the Song, the Sixteen Prefectures had an extra political dimension. Control of the 
Sixteen Prefectures increased the legitimacy of the Song dynasty to rule because the 
prefectures were part of the Central Plain, which was the cultural heartland of China.41 Ruling 
over all of the Central Plain showed that a dynasty was fit to rule over the territories of former 
great dynasties such as the Han and Tang. Conversely, the failure to capture these territories 
damaged the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty. Due to the political value of the Sixteen 
Prefectures for the Song, war was very likely between the Liao and Song empires. There was a 
relatively peaceful period from 960-979 where the two empires enjoyed good political 
                                                             
37 Lorge, War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” p. 2. 
38 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” p. 68. 
39 Naomi Standen, “The Five Dynasties,” The Cambridge History of China Vol. 5 Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its 
Precursors in Dennis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith, ed.,  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 87. 
40 David Curtis Wright, From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century China: Sung’s Relations with Khitan Liao, 
(Leiden, NLD: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005) p. 41 
41 Lorge, “War and the Creation of the Northern Song State,” p. 3. 
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relations.42 However, the Song was occupied with consolidating its position domestically and 
conquering the Southern Kingdoms. The Song was in no position to wage a war of aggression 
against the Liao during that period.  
The ultimate failure to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures left a revanchist legacy at the 
Song court. The prefectures brought up emotions of shame, frustration, and anger.43 Indeed, 
the obsession over the prefectures from Song officials and emperors was more than what 
rational thinking would warrant. The prefectures were important strategically, but the Song still 
found ways to effectively defend its empire. In addition, the Sixteen Prefectures were not as 
important economically to the Song. With the conquest of the Southern Kingdoms in addition 
to its Northern territories, the Song had a large and sound financial base from which to draw 
income. Yet, the Sixteen Prefectures repeatedly appear in Song politics and remained a major 
political issue at court.  
Map 2: Location of the Sixteen Prefectures44 
 
 
                                                             
42 Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire: Early Sung Relations with its Neighbors,” in Morris Rossabi, ed., 
China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries (LA: University of California Press, 
1983), pp. 50-1. 
43 Jing Shen Tao, “Northerners or Barbarians: Northern Sung Images of the Khitan,” in Morris Rossabi, ed., China 
Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries (LA: University of California Press, 1983) 
p. 79, Lau and Huang, “The Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” p. 267.  
44 Standen, “Five Dynasties,” p. 86 
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The Geopolitical Situation Before the Conflict 
East Asia experienced major political change starting in the mid-ninth century. In 840 
A.D., the Uighur Empire collapsed, leaving a power vacuum on the Mongolian steppe. 45 In 880 
A.D., the Huang Chao rebellion, led by the failed examination candidate, Huang Chao, 
effectively destroyed the Tang dynasty.46 Huang sacked the capital, Chang An, and created the 
power vacuum that allowed for the final disintegration of the Tang Empire. The Tang lingered 
on as puppet emperors before being formally ended in 907 A.D by Zhu Wen, founder of the 
Later Liang dynasty. 47(See Map 3) Korea also experienced political decline as the Silla dynasty 
decayed and was replaced by the Koryo dynasty.  
The first to benefit from the political decline were the Khitans under the leadership of 
Abaoji (872-926). The Khitans were based in Southern Manchuria. Abaoji gained control of the 
Khitans in 907 A.D., because the previous leader suffered repeated military setbacks fighting 
against a North China warlord. He led many campaigns that bore fruit late in his life. In 919, 
Abaoji finally conquered several rival tribes. He conquered large tracts of Inner Mongolia and, 
in 925, led a military campaign that reached all the way to the former Uighur capital on the 
Mongolian steppe. Most importantly, he conquered all of Manchuria when he defeated the 
state of Bohai shortly before he died, which brought in a large amount of wealth.48 Abaoji 
started a wise precedent by treating conquered people with care and letting them keep their 
                                                             
45  Michael R. Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire, (Liden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 
2005), p. 37. 
46 Mark Edward Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2009) p. 71.  
47 Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, p. 72. 
48 Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” p. 65-6 
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culture and mode of administration intact.49 This dual administration policy helped gain the 
Liao legitimacy and the loyalty of those conquered.  
Domestically, Abaoji concentrated power in himself. Due to the increased sedentary 
population under his rule, he adopted aspects of Chinese dynasty practice to increase his 
legitimacy. Instead of an election after his death to select the next leader, he named an heir, 
built a temple to Confucius, and finally declared himself Emperor in 916 (r. 916-926).50 
Members of the Khitan elite attempted to block these changes and overthrow Abaoji, but he 
successfully resisted all these attempts. Not all his changes went as planned; his wife and 
members of the Khitan elite passed over his choice of heir for another one of his sons, who 
became Liao Taizong (r. 927-947).51 Liao Taizong strengthened the empire further by acquiring 
the Sixteen Prefectures in assisting the Later Jin overthrow of the Later Tang.  Empeor Shizong 
(r. 947-951) formally divided the Liao Empire into Northern and Southern administrations.52 It 
was a wise decision making Abaoji’s precedent official policy. It avoided social unrest and loss of 
legitimacy from trying to impose nomadic customs on the Han population or vice versa. As a 
result of this state building, by the time the conflict with the Song began in 979, the Liao 
possessed a large military, the fiscal resources to conduct large scale campaigns, and a more 
centralized power structure.   
Another nomadic power that benefitted from the fractured political situation were the 
Tanguts (Xi Xia). The Tanguts were based in the Ordos region, which is the area inside the 
                                                             
49 Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” p. 59 
50 Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” pp. 62-3  
51 Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” pp.68-9  
52 Twitchett and Tietze, “The Liao,” p.77 
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horseshoe-like bend of the Yellow River.53 The Huang Chao Rebellion allowed the Tanguts to 
expand and legitimize their power base, because they had helped suppress it, gaining them 
greater prestige.54 They successfully resisted all attempts by dynasties in North China to 
conquer them.55 The Tanguts too had a conflict with the Song but made peace with them in 
1006.56 The Tanguts went on to be important players in the international system on multiple 
occasions.  
While the Liao and Tanguts were busy expanding and in a process of state building, 
China was in a state of political turmoil. As shown by the four maps below, there was a high 
amount of political turnover, as many of the states in the north and south were short lived. 
South China was divided up among various states known as the Southern Kingdoms.57 None of 
the Southern Kingdoms managed to conquer the others. Indeed, none of them possessed the 
capacity to conquer all of China with the possible exception of the Southern Tang. Overall, 
there was relatively less warfare among the Southern Kingdoms than in the north and as a 
result economic development flourished.58  The south ended up providing much of the wealth 
and population for the Song.59   
Due to the fractured political situation in the south, a dynasty that reunified the north 
was in a good position to conquer and obtain the wealth of the south. However, the Five 
                                                             
53 Ruth Dunnell, “The Xi Xia,” in Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed, The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6 
Alien Regimes and Border States 907-1368 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 171  
54 Dunnell, “Xi Xia,” p. 163 
55 Dunnell, “Xi Xia,” pp. 165, 169 
56 Dunnell, “Xi Xia,” p. 177 
57 Hugh R. Clark, “The Southern Kingdoms Between the T’ang and Sung,” in Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith, 
ed., The Cambridge History of China Vol. 5 Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) p.133. 
58 Clark, “Southern Kingdoms,” pp. 174, 188-9, 194-7. 
59 Clark, “Southern Kingdoms,” p. 205. 
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Dynasties in the north were plagued by military coups or external foes. The Later Liang dynasty 
failed to unify all the north and was in the end, destroyed by their rivals, the Li family who 
established the Later Tang Dynasty.60 However, the Later Tang court soon experienced trouble 
with its military and governors. Military coups dethroned two emperors and the dynasty was 
eventually destroyed by the provincial governor, Shi Jingtang, who founded the Later Jin 
dynasty.61   
Map 3: Five dynasties and Southern Kingdoms 162 
Shi was an old rival of the current Later Tang Emperor before the latter came to the 
throne. The Later Tang increasingly grew suspicious of Shi and eventually backed him into a 
corner that forced him to either accept humiliation or to rebel.63 When Shi rebelled, he did not 
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have the power to defeat the Later Tang on his own so he requested Liao assistance. To gain 
their support, he offered the Liao the Sixteen Prefectures and tribute.64 By offering such 
strategic territory, Shi left his government open to Liao attack, but it showed how serious he 
was about gaining Liao assistance. Liao Taizong quickly seized the opportunity and sent 50,000 
Liao troops to aid the Later Jin troops, which then defeated the Later Tang.65 The Later Jin and 
the Liao experienced good relations until Jintang died and his heir was replaced by another son. 
Relations deteriorated between the Jin and Liao, as the Jin tried to assert its independence.  
The attempt failed and the Later Jin was destroyed by a Liao invasion.66 The Liao tried to 
establish itself as master of North China but was ousted by the founder of the Later Han.67 The 
Later Han proved to be an ineffectual dynasty and was overthrown in a military coup by its 
military commander, Guo Wei, who founded the Later Zhou.68 The remnants of the Later Han 
fled to Taiyuan and founded the Northern Han kingdom.  
Although the Five Dynasties were plagued by coups, they gradually strengthened the 
throne so that by 951, the provincial governors were no longer a threat, leaving the imperial 
army itself as the last force necessary to bring under centralized control.69 Due to a stronger 
central government, the Later Zhou was able to attempt military conquest. The Later Zhou 
conquered parts of two southern kingdoms and even two of the Sixteen Prefectures which 
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became known as the Guanan region.70  The second Later Zhou emperor died in 959 and an 
infant succeeded to the throne, setting the stage for one last military coup.  
Map 4: Five Dynasties and Southern Kingdoms 271 
Zhao Kuangyin executed a military coup in 960 and founded the Song dynasty.  Taizu 
(960-976), as he was known posthumously, put an end to the cycle of military coups by 
implementing a combination of reforms that successfully restrained the military.72 With the 
dynasty internally consolidated, Taizu embarked on a series of campaigns of conquest. Either 
acting on the advice of his chief minister or because the south provided more openings, Taizu 
directed his military campaign to the south. The Song conquered each of the southern 
kingdoms with relative ease. The Southern Tang resisted the longest at fifteen months but fell 
in the end.73  Taizu passed away in 976 and his brother, known posthumously as Taizong (976-
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997), succeeded him. Taizong acquired the last of the Southern Kingdoms, Wu Yue, without a 
fight.74  
The Start of the Conflict: Song Taizong’s Northern Han Campaign 
With the south conquered, the Song turned its attention toward the north.  In 979 A.D., 
acting on the advice of the general, Cao Bin, Taizong ordered an invasion of the Northern Han.75 
In terms of the theory of offensive realism, it was no surprise that the Song attacked the 
Northern Han. The elimination of Northern Han would allow a clear path toward the 
strategically important Sixteen Prefectures. 76  Also, the Song possessed a large amount of 
wealth and had developed a capable and powerful army that was more than a match for the 
Northern Han forces and was capable of winning even if the Liao intervened. The Song showed 
its military might. The Liao sent a relief army to aid Northern Han. The Song army defeated the 
Liao forces, inflicting heavy casualties.77 The Song victory proved to be a decisive factor in the 
campaign. The Liao defeat left Northern Han isolated, and it surrendered after a fifteen- day 
siege of its capital.78  
The victory is a prime example showing that a cavalry was not all powerful in the field.  
The Liao army had the advantage, but still lost to an army that was most likely predominantly 
infantry soldiers. The Song army was arguably at its best in 979 and as its victory in the 
Northern Han campaign showed, was capable of defeating the Liao in the field. It was the tool 
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of a revisionist power, which the Song was at this time in Offensive Realism, and was to be 
taken seriously.  
With the success of the Northern Han campaign, a Song invasion of the Sixteen 
Prefectures was all but guaranteed. The successful conquest would have left all questions of 
legitimacy answered, and defeating a major power in the process would have further increased 
Song prestige and legitimacy. Even looking at the situation from the perspective of Offensive 
Realism, the conquest of the Sixteen Prefectures was the next logical step, as it would add a 
strategic barrier between the Song dynasty and the Liao Empire 
The Blunting of Song Offensive Military Power 
Shortly after the conquest of the Northern Han, Taizong ordered the invasion of the 
Sixteen Prefectures. The timing of the invasion was bad as the Song troops were exhausted and 
not rewarded. 79 The Song army quickly reached Yuzhou, modern day Beijing and the key to the 
Sixteen Prefectures. However the Song failed to take the city. The Liao counter-attacked and 
inflicted a severe defeat on the Song army.80 The defeat ended the campaign and forced the 
Song to be temporarily on the defensive.  
Even if Taizong had waited to rest his troops, it would have been difficult to defeat the 
Liao. The Liao cavalry’s advantage in the open field gave them an edge over the predominantly 
infantry army of the Song. Fighting with exhausted and low-spirited troops increased the 
likelihood and scale of the defeat. If the Song suffered a defeat on such a scale again, it would 
end their chances to capture the Sixteen Prefectures. They would have lost too many of the 
capable infantry that stood a better chance at defeating the Liao. In the years after the 979 
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invasion, the war settled into a stalemate. Each side scored sizeable victories, but nothing was 
decisive.81  As a result, the Song army’s offensive potential remained, but so did the Liao’s 
ability to defend its empire.  
By 986, the Song felt confident enough to launch another invasion of the Sixteen 
Prefectures. The passage of seven years was a rational step by the Song as it had to rebuild its 
strength while dealing with Liao invasions. The political importance of the Sixteen Prefectures 
also guaranteed another attempt at conquest. They were just too politically important for the 
Song to give up after one failed campaign. Initially, the invasion went well as the Song captured 
multiple towns.82 However, the Song army advanced too quickly and overstretched their supply 
lines. As a result, the Song retreated to resupply before resuming the advance.83 Unfortunately, 
the Liao counterattacked around the same time and inflicted a massive defeat on the Song 
military.84 
The failed campaign ended the Song’s desire to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures for the 
time being. The defeat cost the Song most of its crack infantry troops. Thus, the Song did not 
have the skilled manpower necessary to defeat the Liao cavalry army. It was a rational move by 
the Song to switch to and stay on the defensive.  Indeed, the Song focused on building their 
defenses, which included a series of canal systems that greatly increased their ability to defend 
against the Liao.  
The Frustration of Liao Military Power 
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From an Offensive Realism perspective, it would be expected that the Liao would try to 
revise the international situation. The Song had invaded twice and damaged an important 
region of the Liao Empire, giving the Liao ample incentive to attack the Song and reduce its 
military power. The Liao attempted to do just this by implementing a punitive expedition 
strategy that climaxed with its 1004 invasion.  
The Liao did not immediately implement a punitive expedition strategy to secure its 
border. From 989 to 999, there was peace between the Song and Liao empires, and it is not 
entirely clear why the Liao did not attack at this time.85 Regardless, the Liao began their 
punitive expedition strategy with their 999 invasion. The Liao army achieved repeated victories 
in the field but failed to take fortified cities.86 
The Song response was twofold. Emperor Zhenzong (r. 997-1022) led a personal 
campaign part way to the front to boost morale, provide an extra layer of defense to prevent 
further penetration of Song territory, and show his resolve to defend the empire.87 On the front 
lines, the Song Commander, Fu Zan, adopted a passive defense strategy of staying behind city 
walls. The strategy denied the Liao victory.88 By keeping the Song’s military power in 
fortifications, the Song army limited the Liao’s penetration of Song territory. As a result, the 
Liao retreated after using up the supplies in the area.89 Adding to the failure of the campaign, 
the Song army caught the Liao as they were retreating and inflicted ten thousand casualties and 
captured numerous weapons.90 
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The campaign showcases the limitations of the Liao army. The Liao could defeat the 
Song in the open field but was unable to successfully besiege fortified cities. When the Song 
kept their army in fortifications, the Liao could not take and hold Song territory. They could also 
not advance far without the high risk of their retreat being cut off and attacked from the front 
and rear. Without taking the fortified cities, the Liao could not deliver the decisive blow to the 
Song army and the Song‘s threat lingered.  
The Liao’s limitations showed up in subsequent campaigns as well. The campaigns from 
1001 to 1003 bore little fruit. Liao military limitations and Song defensive measures prevented 
any permanent gains. The 1002 campaign was notable for the Liao’s change of strategy. The 
Liao attacked in the summer instead of the fall, catching the Song off guard, but nothing 
decisive occurred.91 The lack of success was very costly to the Liao. The repeated campaigns put 
a heavy burden on Liao finances and were not sustainable over the long term if the campaigns 
were not showing results.92  
Unfortunately for the Liao, the situation was not getting any better for them. In addition 
to the walled cities, the Song were building a series of canals that Peter Lorge calls “The Great 
Ditch of China.”93 The canal system provided faster transportation to the frontier, allowing for 
better rested soldiers and a decreased supply burden on the local population in Hebei.94 The 
canal system also increased agricultural production in the area, further increasing the logistical 
support to the army and the tax revenues to the central government.95 On the tactical side, the 
canal system countered the Liao’s mobility. This advantage gave the Song time to close their 
                                                             
91 Lau, ”Waging War for Peace?,” pp. 195-7 
92 Lau, “Waging War for Peace?,” pp. 191-2 
93 Lorge, “The Great Ditch of China,” p. 59. 
94 Ibid, p.62- 3. 
95 Ibid, p. 63. 
 25 
 
cities’ gates, increasing the chances of successful defense.96 Also, the Song army could pin the 
Liao against the paddy fields around the canals and the canals themselves, which negated the 
mobility of their cavalry. This evened the odds of the fight for the Song army, increasing their 
chances of victory.97The Liao kept to routes that avoided the canals, but those paths were 
disappearing. Zhenzong endorsed the completion of the system, bringing the resources of the 
central government to fill in the gaps of what was previously a local government effort.98 
The canal system looked all the more threatening to the Liao because they understood 
the offensive potential of the canal. The canals could be used as a staging area for invasions.99 
However, the Song only viewed the canal system as a defensive measure. Although the canal 
system had been under construction since 993, the central government did not endorse it until 
after Zhenzong’s ascension, because members of the court thought that it made the Song look 
weak.100An endorsement of the canal system would signal to officials in the government that 
the Song did not have the ability to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures and the goal was to defend 
the empire.  
Abandoning the conquest of the Sixteen Prefectures could not have been an easy 
decision. The prefectures had major political value to the Song. It seems likely this implication 
delayed official sanction of the canal system from the central government. The Song did not 
want to admit that it could not conquer such important territory. The decision to build the 
canal system shows a pragmatic aspect of the Song and put one of the key parts for peace in 
place. The Song no longer aimed at conquering the Prefectures and accepted its current 
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territorial size, but the Song did not trust the Liao in a peace deal. The Liao needed to force the 
Song to the negotiating table and achieve a political solution.  
From the rational choice perspective of offensive realism, this was becoming all the 
more urgent. The military expeditions were costly but not producing results for the Liao. 
Furthermore, the Song was tightening the gaps in its defenses, making the strategy all the more 
futile and fiscally dangerous. The Liao needed a military action large enough to force the Song 
to the negotiating table. 
The Shanyuan Campaign and Its Treaty 
In late 1004, the Liao launched a massive military campaign personally led by the 
Empress Dowager and Emperor Shengzong (r. 1082—1031). However, the Liao ran into heavy 
resistance. Once again, the Liao failed to take fortified cities. The most notable failure occurred 
at Yingzhou in Hebei. The Liao besieged Yingzhou for three weeks and suffered thirty thousand 
casualties before lifting the siege.101  The Liao responded to these failures by bypassing these 
fortresses.  
The strategy allowed the Liao to penetrate further into Song territory, but left their 
retreat vulnerable to being cut off. The willingness to use such a strategy showed that the Liao 
were ready and anxious for a political settlement. The death of their leading general, Xiao Dalin, 
in a skirmish made the Liao all the more anxious for peace.102 From an Offensive Realism 
perspective, the Liao strategy was very rational since it appears the main goal was to force the 
Song to the negotiating table. Penetrating further into Song territory made the invasion appear 
more threatening and increased the chances the Song would come to the negotiating table. 
                                                             
101 Wright, From War to Diplomatic Parity, p. 58. 
102 Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, p. 14. 
 27 
 
Fortunately for the Liao, they succeeded in bringing the Song to the negotiating table, 
allowing for the resolution of the conflict. The invasion caused much anxiety at court, with 
some officials arguing for Zhenzong to flee to the south. However, due to the efforts of Kou 
Zhun and General Gao Qiong, Zhenzong led an army to Shanyuan. On the way to Shanyuan, the 
Song and Liao dynasties began negotiations.103 Zhenzong did not trust the Liao but they had 
penetrated far into Song territory and he was worried about the failure of a military 
engagement, which made him willing to take a risk on negotiations.  
Both sides had ample incentive to conclude a peace agreement.  For the Liao, their 
retreat could be cut off and their military force had proved unable to conquer territory. For the 
Song, the troops at Shanyuan were inexperienced and Shanyuan was easy to besiege.104 The 
Liao wanted the Guanan area in exchange for peace, but Zhenzong rejected that deal.105  Then, 
Zhenzong sent the official Cao Liyong to offer annual payments. Eventually, the Liao accepted 
the Song offer of annual payments. The agreement became known as the Treaty of Shanyuan 
and the terms were as follows: 
1. The establishment of a friendly relationship between  the two states 
2. Annual payments of 100,000 taels of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk to 
the Khitans by the Song as “military compensation” 
3. The demarcation of borders between the two states 
4. An agreement that neither side should detain robbers and fugitives 
5. An agreement that neither side should disturb the farmlands of the other 
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6. An agreement that neither side should construct new fortifications and 
canals along the border  
7. A pledge of a solemn oath with a religious sanction in case of 
contravention106 
The military conflict leading up to the peace treaty was one of the major reasons the 
peace lasted over a hundred years. The military defeats and frustrations showed that each side 
could not use military force to achieve their goals. War cost the Liao and Song Empires too 
many resources, making a compromise necessary. Consequently, the peace was on a solid 
foundation and the threshold for war was raised very high. Each side got something it wanted 
from the other. The Song retained territorial integrity at a relatively cheap cost. As Shiba 
Yoshinobu points out, the Song ran up a huge trade surplus that allowed them to get back the 
entire payment from the Liao.107 The Liao maintained their territorial integrity by getting the 
Song to formally accept the Sixteen Prefectures as part of Liao. The subsidy allowed them to 
build their Central Capital and was a significant portion of the tax revenue.108 
Song and Liao behavior followed offensive realism during the conflict. Each side sought 
to increase its survival through attempted conquest or punitive military expeditions against the 
other. For the most part, each side thought rationally during the conflict and the uncertainty of 
the other’s intentions was relevant as well. Offensive Realism would predict that the Song or 
Liao would break the agreement once one of them built up enough power or the other had 
declined enough that war was worth the risk. Since the Song and Liao were part of a web of 
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states, opportunities were likely for renewed war. If one engaged in war with one of the 
surrounding neighbors, the other might see it as an opportunity to attack and increase its 
relative power. If such a tempting opportunity presented itself, sufficient internal support was 
necessary for peace was needed to ensure enforcement of the treaty.  
Liao Foreign Policy, Post-Shanyuan to 1038 
Members of the Liao court in favor of the Treaty of Shanyuan did not need to do much 
to strengthen internal support for it. The treaty terms were favorable to the Liao and thoughts 
of southern expansion were dashed by the stubborn and effective resistance of the Song. More 
importantly, the Liao was busy securing its borders and establishing favorable relations with 
other states. Thus the Liao was busy revising the international situation in its favor, exactly 
what Offensive Realism would predict.  
The most notable example of Liao’s strategy was its conflict with the Koryo dynasty of 
Korea a few years after the signing of the Treaty of Shanyuan.  In 1010, the Koreans rejected 
vassal status to the Liao. In response, the Liao embarked on multiple campaigns to coerce Korea 
back into vassal status. The Liao campaign achieved early success with the sacking of the 
Korean capital.109 However, the Koreans continued to resist and the conflict dragged on for 
years. In 1018, the Koreans severely defeated a Liao invasion. 110  However, the armed 
aggression accomplished its goal. In 1020, the Koreans accepted vassal status again.111 
As the campaign shows, the Liao was not interested in conquest or extracting as many 
resources as possible. As long as they had agreements that were favorable for them, the Liao 
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emperor and his court were willing to keep the peace. Liao behavior was in accordance with 
Offensive Realism, but it is arguable that the Liao did not push for as much as they could have 
obtained.  
Song Foreign and Domestic Affairs, Post-Shanyuan to 1038 
 In the years after the peace treaty, Emperor Zhenzong became more lethargic.112 At the 
same time, he made a conscious effort to hear multiple opinions during policy discussions. 
These circumstances created an opening for factional competition. As the emperor became 
more lethargic, a power vacuum was left open. If a faction could consistently gain imperial 
support, they would be in a position to determine and implement government policy. For a 
better understanding of the factional struggles, it is necessary to have a brief overview of key 
institutions and players in the Song government.  
 The emperor, Secretariat-Chancellery, and Bureau of Military Affairs were the most 
important policy makers. If an emperor was decisive and assertive enough, he could make his 
preferences the policy of the empire. In the absence of an assertive emperor, there was a 
power vacuum that could lead to coalitions of officials competing with each other to gain 
power over government policy. The Song had many lethargic or non-activist emperors, leaving a 
particularly large power vacuum because the Song system demanded a strong and activist 
emperor.113 Consequently, factional conflict often ensued, with rival leaders of the bureaucracy 
vying for power.114  
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 For foreign and military policy, the Commissioner of the Bureau of the Military Affairs 
was a very important player. In general, the Bureau oversaw border defense, logistics, and 
military preparation.115 Due to the important matters the Commissioner dealt with, he had easy 
access to the emperor and his policy recommendations had great weight in any debate.  
 An equal, if not more important position to influence government policy was the Chief 
Councilor, because he headed the Secretariat-Chancellery.116  The Secretariat-Chancellery had 
tremendous authority over administrative affairs despite the fact that its powers overlapped 
with those of other parts of the bureaucracy.117 In addition, the Chief Councilor enjoyed the 
highest status in the bureaucracy. Consequently, he too had easy access to the emperor and his 
opinions on any matter carried influence.118 A Chief Councilor was in the best position to build 
coalitions and influence government policy as a whole.  
 The Chief Councilor and Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs were Wang Dan 
and Wang Qinruo, respectively, from around 1006 to 1017. These men had different positions 
on foreign policy. Wang Dan advocated conciliation while Wang Qinruo favored a more 
belligerent foreign policy. The principal time of competition between their two opposing views 
occurred between 1006-1010. The debates showcase the potential of an irrational decision by 
the standards of Offensive Realism and support the case that the potential for such an 
occurrence should be taken seriously.  
In 1006, the Tangut leader Li Deming requested the mourning rights that came with his 
nominal position in the Song bureaucracy after his mother passed away. Wang Qinruo took the 
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belligerent position that the request be denied, because Li Deming did not come to request 
them in person. Wang Dan advocated that the court must grant him the mourning rights in 
order to pacify the northwest. Zhenzong agreed with Wang Dan and granted Li Deming the 
mourning rights he requested and other honors.119 
 The debate shows the limitations of the rational thinking model. Dan and Qinruo 
operated under different assumptions that affected what was a rational choice. Underlining 
Wang Qinruo’s argument is that Li Deming did not show proper respect to the Song court.  
Consequently, Li Deming did not deserve the respect and honor of receiving the morning rights 
that went with his position, regardless of the power politics consequences. On the other side, 
Wang Dan thought peaceful and strong relations were needed with neighboring states. With 
their different assumptions, the potential existed for an irrational decision, but Zhenzong 
rationally choose to grant the mourning rites. The Song had just concluded wars with the Liao 
and the Tanguts, necessitating a conciliatory foreign policy to rebuild internal strength. Sparking 
a diplomatic spat that could lead to a more serious situation would not serve that goal.   
 In the years after this debate, Wang Dan continued to promote a conciliatory foreign 
policy. In 1008, Li Deming requested grain for famine relief. The vast majority of the 
bureaucracy advocated that the request be denied. However, Wang Dan advocated that the 
Song give the Xi Xia the grain if Li Deming came to Kaifeng. It was in the interest of the Song to 
give the famine relief, because the need to avoid belligerent relations and focus on internal 
strength was still present. Furthermore, the Song did not need to risk the Tanguts raiding their 
territory for the grain if the Song did not give it to them. However, the sheer number of officials 
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who were against giving the grain made it a real possibility that an irrational decision would be 
made. However, Zhenzong backed Wang Dan’s proposal, and the Tanguts were given the grain 
in the capital.120  Also, by 1008, Zhenzong had become dissatisfied with the Treaty of 
Shanyuan’s provisions.  Instead of undermining the treaty’s provisions, Zhenzong decided to 
carry out the Sacrifices to Heaven and Earth to bolster Song prestige in relation to the Liao.121 
 The year 1010 saw conciliation firmly entrenched as the guiding foreign policy principle 
of the Song. As noted, above, the Koryo-Liao conflict started at this time. At the Song court, 
Zhenzong solicited advice about a possible Korean request for military assistance. Wang Dan 
advocated that the Song should reject any Korean request, because they had not sent tribute in 
many years. Zhenzong accepted Wang’s advice and ordered that Korean embassies should not 
be given passage into Song territory.122 As a result, several Korean missions requesting military 
assistance failed to gain entry into Song territory.123 This policy was the right decision. There 
was military parity between the Song and Liao making any military operation risky. Koryo was 
no great power and only marginally increased the chances of a Song victory in a war with the 
Liao. Add the Song difficulties for offensive operations and it was likely that Song military 
intervention on behalf of Koryo would fail and further weaken the Song relative to the Liao. 
The potential of an irrational decision has to be taken seriously. The 1008 debate over 
handing over grain is a good example of the risk of an irrational decision. The majority of the 
bureaucracy was against the request, but Zhenzong’s preference for conciliation being the main 
reason that prevented an irrational decision. There were multiple contextual factors in the Song 
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that increased the chances of an irrational decision. The Song Empire had endured multiple 
defeats and humiliations and members of the bureaucracy appeared determined to prevent 
further humiliations. Zhenzong’s own dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Shanyuan shows 
dissatisfaction in the Song government that the Sixteen Prefectures were not conquered and 
that the Song was sending the Liao payments. However, the memory and lessons of the war 
with Liao greatly limited chances of an irrational decision toward the Liao, as shown by how 
quickly the Song ruled out military intervention on behalf of Korea. The limitation of the 
rational choice model showed its full effect and that the Song was not the only power to be 
affected by them during the Song-Xi Xia war of 1038-44. 
The Song-Xi Xia War of 1038-44 
 Relations between the Song and Tanguts under Li Deming’s leadership were not perfect. 
Li adopted a belligerent attitude toward the Song on multiple occasions, which led to occasional 
tension between the Tanguts and Song.124 However, relations were largely peaceful overall. 
This situation came to an end with the accession of Yuanhao to Tangut leadership in 1032. A 
very capable general who was responsible for conquering several oasis states in Central Asia, he 
wanted the Song to recognize him as an equal. In 1038, he declared his own dynasty and 
started a war to force the Song to recognize him as an equal.125 The war took place along the 
border between the Ordos region and the rest of China proper, where the two empires met.  
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 Yuanhao gained early success. In 1040, at the battle of Sanchuan, Yuanhao defeated a 
Song army and inflicted around 20,000 casualties.126  This prompted the Song to attempt an 
offensive.127 Before the Song could mount an offensive, Yuanhao attacked again. The Song 
counter-attacked, but it went badly. Song forces lost over 6,000 troops and several field 
commanders.128  
 The Song defeats sent reverberations throughout international relations. The Liao 
debated whether to attack the Song or not. An official, Xiao Hui, argued that the Liao should 
take advantage of the Song’s current weakness and attack. Initially, Emperor Xingzong(r. 1031-
1055) agreed to the policy proposal. However, the retired Prime Minister, Zhang Jian, 
interceded and advocated that the Liao should send an envoy to ask for the Guanan region. 
Emperor Xingzong followed Zhang’s advice.129  
 The Liao envoy reached the Song court and requested the Guannan region, but Emperor 
Renzong (r. 1022-63) refused. The Song official Fu Bi was sent to negotiate with the Liao about 
this issue.130 At the Liao court, Emperor Xingzong continued demanding the Guannan region. Fu 
Bi successfully resisted all Xingzong’s attempts at persuasion. Emperor Xingzong relented in his 
demands for the Guannan region.131 However, Fu Bi was in a very weak negotiating position 
and would have to give up something. The Liao obtained an increase in annual payments. Also, 
the Liao agreed to pressure the Xi Xia to make peace with the Song132  
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 The negotiations clearly show the limitations of the rational choice model of offensive 
realism. Offensive realism would have predicted that the Liao would have attacked the Song in 
1042 to conquer territory and deliver a massive blow to the Song, which would have been 
fighting on two fronts. More importantly, the Xi Xia had inflicted multiple and large defeats on 
the Song army. These defeats indicated a weakened Song army. When considering that the Xi 
Xia was smaller and weaker than the Liao, it was quite possible the Liao could have obtained 
even larger and more significant victories against the Song.  
Yet, Emperor Xingzong declined to attack the Song. Indeed, he eventually relented on 
his demands for territory. He was in a very strong negotiating position, and if he had persisted 
and backed up his demands with a credible threat of war, he may have gotten the Song to give 
up territory. The fact that he did not pursue such a course shows that Xingzong did not want 
war but simply wanted to gain some sort of material benefit from the Song. It seems that 
Emperor Xingzong was satisfied with peace even though war could have quite possibly left the 
Liao in a better situation.  
His actions did not come without negative consequences for the Liao. In 1043, Li 
Yuanhao raided the Liao frontier.133 He was apparently dissatisfied that he had gained nothing 
from his victories over the Song while the Liao gained benefit because of his efforts. The Liao 
requested that the Song join them in a military operation attacking the Xia. Instead, the Song 
seized the opportunity to make peace with the Xi Xia without granting them diplomatic 
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equality.134 The Liao never reprimanded the Song for denying its request. It was busy fighting 
the Xi Xia and was defeated.135 
Domestic politics proved to be decisive in preventing war between the Liao and Song 
during the Song-Xi Xia War. However, domestic politics could not always be relied upon to 
prevent war. A faction or emperor that favored conquest could gain control of the government. 
This change in domestic politics was an especially real possibility in the Song. The shame of 
failing to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures was always there and could find expression if the 
right emperor or official was in control of the government. The next section examines how this 
happened in the Song and its consequences for international relations in the region. 
The Renewal of Song Expansionism 
From the end of the Xi Xia war to 1067, the domestic situation in the Song was for the 
most part calm, and there was no major change in attitudes toward foreign policy. This 
situation changed in 1067 with the accession of Emperor Shenzong (r 1067-1085).  Shenzong 
was determined to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures and the Ordos region to wipe out the 
shame of past Song military failures.136 Indeed, he was representative of a growing group of 
generals and officials that did not accept the international situation as it was. Many officials 
acutely felt the humiliation and shame of failing to conquer politically important territory and 
wanted aggressive action as a result.137  
Shenzong himself immediately acted on this desire for conquest by approving a scheme 
to conquer the Xi Xia prefecture of Suizhou on the Song-Xi Xia border. The Song successfully 
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captured Suizhou, but the campaign led to larger conflict from 1070-1071, where the Song 
failed to expand territory beyond Suizhou, now renamed Suide. In the process, the Song 
suffered multiple defeats, showing the pressing need for military reform.138 
The campaign illustrates the political potency of Shenzong’s irredentist ambition and 
that  it went against rational thinking. The objective of conquest was not irrational. The Song 
had multiple reasons to weaken the Xi Xia or conquer it. The Xi Xia attacked the Song border 
again during the mid 1060s and the Xi Xia threatened to conquer a Tibetan kingdom called 
Qingtang. If that happened, the Song’s access to horses would have been more restricted while 
the Xi Xia would have been a stronger force if it attacked the Song again.139  How Shenzong 
went about achieving this goal was irrational. Shenzong did not undertake a proper assessment 
of Song military capability. Indeed, Shenzong approved the plan in secret, relying completely on 
the assessment of the officials who carried out the campaign.140 Thus Shenzong’s enthusiasm 
got the better of him and the Song suffered defeats as a result. He would have to find ways to 
improve the Song military’s capabilities and the state’s ability to fund campaigns.  
In part because of his desire to conquer the Xi Xia and Liao, Shenzong backed the 
reforms of Wang Anshi. The government established a tea monopoly in Sichuan. The profits 
from the monopoly were used to buy over ten thousand horses a year from the Tibetans.141 To 
further increase the supply of horses, the government established a Public Horse Breeding 
program where families took care of horses in exchange for a tax exemption.142 The Court also 
established a training academy for army officers and the Baojia system, a militia type of 
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organization that aimed to use farmers as soldiers, to bolster military strength as well.143  
Concurrently, Wang’s more famous domestic reforms led to a large amount of wealth being 
accumulated by the government to be used for military expeditions.144 
While the military and economic reforms were ongoing, the Song government 
restrained itself in its dealings with its two powerful neighbors. The Song experienced two 
border disputes with the Liao in 1072-73 and 1074-75 respectively. The Song government 
resolved these situations by either complying with Liao demands or negotiating a solution.145  
The Song had not given up on its efforts to conquer the Xi Xia and the Liao. The Song 
was first attacking weaker targets that brought with them resources or were of strategic 
importance before attacking the Liao and Xi Xia. In the southern frontier regions of the modern 
day provinces of Sichuan and Hunan, officials such as Xiong Ben and future chief councilor 
Zhang Dun successfully conquered or negotiated the acquisition of large tracts of land.146 The 
conquest of land in the south increased tax rolls or valuable resources.147 Also, Shenzong and 
Wang Anshi fervently supported the venture of general Wang Shao to capture the Tao river 
area, in the northwest border with the Xi Xia, and to defeat the Tibetan leader Muzheng. Part of 
the justification of these actions was to force the Tanguts to spread their forces thin.148 The 
Song defeated Muzheng and conquered most of the Tao River area in 1074.149  
Shenzong’s Xi Xia Campaign 
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Song success against the tribal groups made a campaign against the Xi Xia inevitable. 
Shenzong would not be denied his chance to avenge the shame of previous defeats.  
From an Offensive Realism perspective, war was likely. The Song enjoyed a decisive wealth 
advantage over the Xi Xia while the military reforms increased combat effectiveness. 
Furthermore, icy relations between the Xi Xia and the Liao left them more vulnerable to Song 
invasion. All the Song needed was the right opportunity to invade. 
Map 5: The 1081 Xi Xia Campaign150 
That opportunity came in 1081. The Empress Dowager of the Xi Xia imprisoned her son 
for trying to move closer to the Song and for reportedly trying to turn over the Southern Ordos 
region to the Song.151 Shenzong began actively preparing for war.152 Using offensive realism, 
this decision was quite rational. The Song had built up a large war chest while its military had 
conquered a tribal state near the Xi Xia. If the conquest was successful, the Song would gain 
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new pastures for horses and increased population. Also, the Song would have far easier access 
to Central Asia and their supply of quality war horses. With such resources, the Song would 
have enough resources and military might to once again wage war against the Liao. Indeed, in 
terms of the theory of offensive realism, it would have been a rational choice to wage war at 
some point against the Liao. For the peace to be maintained, the Xi Xia had to successfully resist 
the Song invasion.  
The Song invasion force was divided into five armies led by the Generals Li Xian, Gao 
Zunyu, Liu Chang Zuo, Wang Zhong Zheng, and Chong O. Initially, their efforts went quite well. 
The Song armies scored multiple and significant victories against Xi Xia, defeating cavalry armies 
varying in size from 20,000 to 80,000.153 These victories allowed Li Xian to capture the city of 
Lanzhou on the Yellow River and for Gao and Lui’s armies to reach the key Xi Xia city of 
Lingzhou. At this point, the campaign ran into lack of food. This lack of food undermined the 
combat capability of the Song soldiers, prevented Wang and Chong from reaching Lingzhou and 
led to bickering among the commanders who did reach LIngzhou. The Tanguts used this 
opportunity to execute a flood attack that forced the Song to retreat. Li Xian’s army achieved 
one of the few permanent gains of the campaign with the capture of Lanzhou and retreated 
back to that city after learning about the defeats of the other armies.154  
The first campaign saw multiple Song victories, showing military reform had a positive 
effect on Song performance. Thus, it was quite rational that the Song tried another invasion the 
following year. The leader of the campaign, Xu Xsi, chose a logistically indefensible position and 
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it was a complete disaster, leading to over 15,000 casualties.155 The failure of the second 
campaign led Shenzong to abandon expansionism.  He died in 1085 and his young son, Zhezong 
(r. 1085-1100) came to the throne, leading to renewed factional competition. 
Continued Factional Competition 
Because Zhezong was a minor, a regency was instated. The Empress Dowager backed 
the anti-reform faction led by Sima Guang, which subsequently rescinded the New Policies and 
purged most of the reform faction.156 Also, the anti-reform faction completely rejected 
offensive military action, dismissing it as mere adventurism. 157  The rejection of offensive 
military action was shown in the peace agreement of 1089. In the 1089 agreement, the Song 
did not give up Lanzhou but ceded other territory along the border that revised the border in 
favor of the Xi Xia.158 This position once again shows the limits of the rational choice model. In 
Offensive Realism, no policy maker would reject offensive war as an option and cede land 
unless the foe far out classed them. This was not the case with the Song and Xi Xia. Although 
the campaigns ultimately failed, the Song inflicted multiple defeats on the Xi Xia. Offensive 
realism would not have predicted such a move, considering the two empires were militarily 
equal, with the Song military possibly being superior. Clearly, the anti-reform faction operated 
under different assumptions than Offensive Realism expects. Even when the Xi Xia launched an 
offensive and broke the peace in 1093, the Song did not retaliate with a counter offensive of its 
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own.159 The anti-reform faction stuck to their non-belligerent foreign policy. Xi Xia aggression 
was a circumstance meant to be endured. 
The resurgence of the anti-reform faction represented the last attempt to shore up 
internal support for a conciliatory foreign policy. If this faction had solidified political power, not 
only would the peace have been on excellent footing, but surrounding states would have 
worried less about a possible Song invasion. However, Zhezong came of age in 1093, and he 
idolized his father. He brought the reform faction back into power, and the anti-reform faction 
was removed from government.160 The removal of the reform faction did not signal a return to 
a rational foreign policy. The reform faction, led by Chief Councilor Zhang Dun, reinstated a 
belligerent foreign policy, and war was renewed with the Xi Xia three years later, after the Song 
had built enough wealth to launch campaigns again. Thus foreign policy also distinguished the 
two factions. To be a member of the reform faction was to promote expansionism. A lack of 
resources was a circumstance meant to be overcome. Once again the Xi Xia had to survive if the 
peace between the Liao and Song empires was to be preserved. If the Xi Xia were conquered, 
the Song could very well have acquired the resources necessary to launch a war against the Liao 
Empire.  
The Campaign of 1097-1099 
The campaign of 1097 to 1099 proved to be the greatest period of military success for 
the Song against the Xi Xia. Using an advance and fortify strategy, the Song was able to bring 
the Xi Xia state to its knees and was in good position to eliminate it. The fact that the Song did 
not do so after Liao diplomatic intervention shows the lasting legacy of the defeats of 1081-
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1082. The Song was rightfully weary of bringing the Liao into the conflict and fighting on two 
fronts.  
 
Map 6: 1097-1099 Campaign against the Xi Xia161 
The key to Song success in the war was an advance and fortify strategy where the Song 
would fortify a taken area before moving on to another area and repeating the process. 
General Li Huiqing was especially adept in using this strategy. He built nine strategic forts that 
revised the border in favor of the Song.162 The Xi Xia initiated a counter offensive to reverse 
Song gains by targeting the important Song fortress of Pingxia. The campaign failed 
disastrously.  The Song lifted the siege of Pingxia and followed with a counter attack of their 
own, which inflicted a massive defeat on the Xi Xia and led to the capture of even more Xi Xia 
territory.163  
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At this point, the Song had successfully revised the international situation in their favor. 
Xi Xia military power had been temporarily neutralized and the Song had an excellent 
opportunity to advance further into Xi Xia territory and possibly eliminate the Tangut empire 
and become a major threat to the Liao Empire. The Liao realized this and quickly intervened, 
sending a diplomatic mission to the Song court demanding they make peace with the Xi Xia.  
Simultaneously, the Liao emperor conducted a hunting expedition near the Song border, 
signaling that the Liao might intervene militarily as well.164 With this diplomatic pressure, the 
Song made peace with the Xi Xia but kept the conquered territory.165 
The Song was effectively contained by an awareness of its own limitations. The Xi Xia 
proved to be a very worthy opponent for the Song. Only if the Song faced the Xi Xia one on one 
would the Song be capable of defeating the Xi Xia. Thus it is quite understandable that the Song 
would be cautious about provoking further Liao involvement in the conflict. The Xi Xia inflicted 
major defeats and even the potential of Liao military involvement posed the real risk that Song 
gains would be erased. With the Liao intervention, the Xi Xia was saved, preventing the Song 
from gaining access to the resources of the Xi Xia and opening a gateway to Central Asia. 
Without this, the Song could not build up the capability to attack the Liao and the length of the 
peace was extended.  
The Song never again would have such an opportunity to revise the international 
situation in their favor. The Xi Xia recovered from their defeats in the 1090s, as the Song 
learned firsthand. Although the expansionist impulse was temporarily subdued, the reform 
faction was still ascendant and an expansionist foreign policy was part of who they were. 
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Inevitably, there were more wars with the Xi Xia. However, the Song never had the same 
battlefield success. Worse, the Song was humiliated multiple times, leading to hundreds of 
thousands of casualties.166  
With such a weakened Song army, the peace was likely to last a while as the Song did 
not have the capability to attack the Liao or even defeat the Xi Xia. However, the rise of the Jin 
changed all that. The Jin eventually destroyed the Liao. In this situation, the Song felt there was 
an excellent opportunity to recover the Sixteen Prefectures and it allied with Jin. After the Liao 
was fatally crippled, the Song launched two military operations to capture the Sixteen 
Prefectures from the remnants of the Liao but failed both times. 167 Eventually, the Song 
provoked a Jin invasion leading to the loss of all of North China.  
Conclusion 
 Looking at the factors that contributed to the peace, the role of conflict, domestic 
politics, and the multistate system were crucial for why it lasted so long. Of the three, the role 
of conflict is most intriguing. The prolonged conflict did leave a lasting animosity between the 
two empires. The Song quickly seized the opportunity to attack the Liao as soon as it was clear 
that the Liao was greatly weakened from Jin defeats. However, the war forced the leaders of 
the Song and Liao empires to compromise and agree to terms that were acceptable to both. At 
the same time, their relative military parity sent a clear message to each empire that the status 
quo could not be changed anytime soon. It was very important that both sides wanted peace by 
the end. If one side or the other had a distinct military advantage over the other, the peace 
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would not have lasted as long or might not have happened at all, especially if the Song was the 
stronger military power. It would have gone on to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures and bring 
about the fall of the Liao Empire. Thus it seems that armed conflict can only lay a foundation for 
peace if military parity is maintained leading both sides to compromise.  
 The multistate system and domestic politics were both required to maintain and extend 
the peace. The absence of one or the other would have resulted in war between the Song and 
Liao Empires before the rise of Jin. Domestic politics set the conditions of policy making. There 
were a limited number of policy options available which depended on the preferences of the 
emperor or the dominant faction. These emperors and factions undermined the rational choice 
model of offensive realism by rejecting the notion that the primary goal was to survive by 
revising the international situation in their favor. When that happened, the actions offensive 
realism would predict did occur. The most glaring example of this was Xingzong’s decision not 
to attack. It could not be taken for granted that any domestic group would hold power for a 
prolonged period of time. Consequently, groups in any state in favor of a certain foreign policy 
position must be on guard and always push for more people with similar or the same positions 
to be in government and hold key offices.  
 Since factions favoring a belligerent or expansionist foreign policy could gain control of 
policy, domestic politics could solely maintain the peace between the Liao and Song Empires. 
The multistate system was also important in preventing war between the two empires. Indeed, 
the multistate system was the biggest reason why the Song did not attack the Liao from 1068 to 
until the 1120s. The Song was effectively contained by the survival of the Xi Xia, preventing it 
from obtaining the necessary resources to conduct a war against the Liao.   
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 Finally, comments on the validity of Offensive Realism are necessary. Offensive Realism 
was generally accurate. It is very useful in analyzing the Song-Liao war and the foreign policy 
actions of Emperor Shenzong of the Song. It is also good for explaining why there was a high 
level of political support for peace with Liao in the Song despite Song displeasure with the 
Treaty of Shanyuan. Even when the theory is undermined by domestic politics, it is still useful. 
For example, it is still able to explain why the Song stopped their war against the Xi Xia in 1099.  
 Offensive realism proved to be mostly valid for the situation, which reflects positively on 
its use for modern day international relations. However, the same factors that undermined the 
theory for the Song-Liao war still exist and are even prevalent today. Domestic politics could 
quite possibly lead states to reject the offensive realism tenet of increasing one’s power by 
revising the international situation in one’s favor. This occurrence is more likely to occur in 
democracies where periodic elections guarantee that different options are made available. 
These different policies options could very well operate under different assumptions than 
Offensive Realism and lead to what the theory would consider to be non-rational outcomes.   
 In today’s international environment, the globalised world may be even more effective 
today in preventing conflict between two great powers than the multistate system of the Song 
and Liao. Great powers today have global influence and are involved on multiple continents 
simultaneously spreading out a great power’s resources. The best example of that today is the 
United States with military bases and interests all over the world. This situation leaves the 
United States to focus on one or two regions with the Middle East and South Asia taking up the 
bulk of its time and resources. Whether or not it could it could wage a potential war against 
another great power while being heavily involved in all these regions remains an open question. 
 49 
 
Thus Offensive Realism is a useful tool for analyzing international relations. As with any theory, 
a person must keep in mind its limitations and what is learned from the instances for which it 
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Appendix B:  Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 
Five Dynasties: 
Later Liang 907-923 
Later Tang 923-936 
Later Jin 936-947 
Later Han 947-951 




Former Shu 907-925 
Wu-Yueh 907-978 
Southern Han 917-971 
Chu 927-963 
Later Shu 934-965 
Southern Tang 937-975 
Northern Han 951-979 
